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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

IH<:TTY A~KHt·:~.
[> cl i Uoner and A p }Jclla Ill,

-vs.Till·: l:\I>U8TRIAL CUJ\11llSSION
OF rTAII. ~PEHHY HA~D CORPOlL\'rlO:\, and LIBERTY 1\IUTPAL 1:\~lTlL\~CJ•: COl\IPANY,
Defcndauts and Respondents.

Case No. 9969

APPELLANT'N BRIEF

~TATE.Jl~:\T

OF THE KIXD OF

CA~l£

Tlus i~ a <:asp which arise::; fron1 the denial of \Vorkmen's l'ompl·nsation IH:'!ll' fib to appellant by the \Vorknwn\ Compensation insurer of appellant's mnployer for
injuri('8 resulting fr.om a fall during appellant's lunch
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hour in a cafeteria operated by a lessee within the building of appellant's e1nployer where appellant wa~ employed, and frmn the denial by the Industrial Comlllission of appellant's application to have a determination
1nade that the injuries occurred in the course of or arose
out of appellant's employment.

DISPOSITIOX IK INDUSrrRIAL
COMnliSSION OF THE STATE OF"' UTAH
r_rhe application of appellant to the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah for a determination that
the appellant was entitled to the benefits ·of the vVorkInen's Compensation Act on the ground that the injuries
occurred in the course of or arose out of appellant's
employment was denied and the Industrial Commission
found that the injury did not arise out of or in the course
of appellant's employment. Appellant's Application for
Re-Hearing, as amended, was denied by the Industrial
Commission and appellant petitioned for and obtained
a 'Vrit of Review to this Honorable Court.

STATE~1EN~"'

OF FACTS

The salient facts with few exceptions were stipulated
to by the parties at the beginning of the hearing before
tlw Industrial Counni~~ion ·Of Utah. These facts a:r;-e as
foJlow:-;:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1. "At the tilne of the accident Plaintiff was an
employee of Sperry l ~tah Engine·ering Laboratory, a division of Defendant Sperry Rand Corporation. Defendant Sperry provided, for the use
and convenience of its employees, a cafeteria in
connection with its Clearfield Plant. The cafeteria was operated by Defendant Clark's Cafel~:ria, under a contractual arrange1nent with Defl'ndant Sperry Rand, the details of which are not
relevant to the issues here. Food is offered for
sale at the cafeteria and employees n1ay, if they·
prefer, bring their lunches from home and Pat
them in the cafeteria. Employees are not required
to eat at the cafeteria, and n1ay, if they desire to
do ~o, eat in other areas in the plant, or in other
areas on the base, or they 1nay, if they wish, leave
the base during the lunch hour. However, they
have only 48 minutes for lunch.
"On the day of the accident, Plaintiff had purchased her lunch in the cafeteria and after having
eaten it, and while carrying her tray to the dishwashing area in accordance with the customary
practice, in some manner fell, sustaining injuries
for which she brings this action. Admittedly
Plaintiff was not paid for her lunch hour period,
and she could utilize the time as she saw fit."
Employees on day shift were allowed a 48
minute lunch hour and it was inconvenient to purchase lunch at facilities other than the cafeteria
locat0d within the building where appellant was
employed. Appellant customarily ate at the leased
eafeteria within said building. There is smne dispute as to what percentage of other employees
~imilarly situated used thi~ eafeteria and what
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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percentage ate elsewhere, but at lea::;t it must be
agr~ed that a substantial pPrcentage of employees

ava1led then1selves of the s.aid eating facilities.
The cafeteria was located within the four walls
of the buildi~~ _where appellant wa::; employed,
and. .other fac1hbes were some distance awav.,., re(lUlnng travel to and from them bY autmnobile
(R-Page 19 and 20).
·
The cafeteria facilitie~ in the building where
Askren was ernployed were furnished as a
''fringe benefit" for the e1nployees and was maintained prinmrily for the use and benefit of the
employees by Sperry Rand Corporation. rrhe
only other users of the cafeteria were o-ccasional
visitors and vendors. (R-Page 32-Lines 8 to 17).
2.

~in;.

ST ATEl\lE~T OF POIX11 S
ARGl~l\IEXT

POINT I.
THAT THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE INJURY AND RESULTING CLAIM
OF APPELLANT WAS NOT COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT IN
THAT THE INJURY DID NOT OCCUR IN THE COURSE
OF OR ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF APPELLANT AND IN DENYING APPELLANT'S APPLICATION
FOR RE-HEARING.

In analyzing the con~iderable number of antlwritie:)
on tl1i~ point, the Court ~honld bear in mind that the
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vrovi:-;ioH:' pf the \Yorknten ·~ C01npensation Act, Sections

::~l-1--~;) nnd :1CJ-1-60, U.C.A., 19G3, provides that injuries
ure covered under two alternative ·situations, that is, the
.\l't provides coverag·e~ for injuries. caused by_ ·accidents
ari~ing out of or in the course of a workman's empJoynll'nt (emphasis added). The "\Vorlunen'~ Compensation
:-;tatute~ of many state~ re(1uire that for injuries to be
l\)lllpensable they must arise out of and in the course of
t'IIIployment. rrhe Utah Court has recognized this distim·tion as being a real and valid one. In U t.ah Apex
.1/iu.ing ( 'ompauy v. lndt£strial Commission, 67 Utah 537,
~~~

P. -190, the Court states:
The Utah Industrial Act allows compensation for injuries to employees, within the act, resulting from "accident ar:i:sing out of or in the
course of their e1nployment." The Utah statute
is distinguishable frorn the statutes ofother states
and the English statute in that it allows cJompensation when the accident arises in the course
of the employrnent whether it arises out of the
employrnent or not. It must be conceded that in
most cases where an employee sustains an injury
which is compensable both conditions will be
found to exist. But it is conceivable that many
accidents may occur in the course of employment
which do not arise out of it. This distinction has
been reeognized by this Oourt in several cases
heretofore decided, State Road Con1n1. v. Ind.
Comm., 56 rtah 252, 190 P. 54-!; Twin Peaks Canning Co. Y. Ind. Comm., 57 Utah 589, 196 P. 853,
~0 A.L.R. S7:2: Cudahy Packing Co.\. Ind. Comm.,
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60 l~tah 161, ~U7 P. 1±8, 2S A.L.H. 139-±..An
award of compensation in each of the cases above
cited was sustained by this Court on the theon
that the accident arose in the course of emplo):_
ment. In State Road Cornmission Case, supra, it
was expressly held that the accident did not arise
out of the emploJinent, but did arisP in the course
of it. In the other two cases the inference i:;; nlmost conclusive t~o the saine effect.
In a treatise recently published by Corpus
.Juris on •\V or.luuen's Compensation Aets,' the
author at pages 72, 73, says:
"The expressions 'arising out of' and
'in the course of' the employ1nent are not
synonynwus; but the words 'arising out of'
are construed to refer to the origin or cause
of the injury, and the ,,·ords 'in the course of'
to refer to the time, place, and circumstances
under which it occurred. An injury which
occurs in the course of the emplo~'ment will
ordinarily, but not necessarily, arise out
of it, while an injtu~- arising out ,of an employnlent ahnost necessarily oecurs in the
course of it.''
The definition of the terms referred to in the
excerpt just quoted is about as concise as can be
found in anY of the authorities we have examined.
A~ the statutes o.f nearlv all the states require
the fulfillment of both co~ditions before compensation is allowed, it is not to be expected that the
eourb in such jurisdictions would often find it
necessar~· to d~fferentiate hehn•en the two.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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l'l'rhap~ our own decisions to which we have
referred furnish as sure a guide as can be found
as to when, and in what circumstances the distinction should be applied.

The court wPn t on and applied the distinctvon by
,·it ing and eomparing fact situations in light of this distindion and the court concluded as follows:
" ... We doubt if there is any better illusrtation of the distinctilon between the two conditions
named in the statute than is found in the English
case referred to. The employee was in the course
of his employmenrt when he undertook to go across
the tracks tJo the messroom to prepare his breakfast, but the origin or cause of his injury was not
connected with his employment. . . .
~ll•moranda

of Authorities were submitted by interested parties for consideration by the Industrial Commi:5~ion and it is interesting to note that even "'the Memorandum of defendant admits that the numerical weight
of the authority supports the applicant's position" (RPage -t~). Defendant then asserts that, however, the
better reasoned cases are in favor of the position
espoused hy defendant.
A nwnber of Utah cases dealing with the general
~mbject matter of this appeal were cited in the various

~femoranda but no

directly in point had been deeided by the Supremr Court of the State of r tah. Seldmn
ca::;p::;
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i~

an appellant to the Honorable Court fortunate enough
to receive an advance declaration of this Court's view
of the law on that appellant'::; specific situation before
the appellant'~ ta~e is heard. However·, this· appears to
have happened in the instant 1natter. In the case ur La
Preal Wil.,on L:. Searc._,., Roel;uck & CoJJlpany, &upreme
Cottrt .No. 9793, which is :-:;till in the advance sheets and
the decision in which wa~ rendered unanimous!~· \\'ith the
Pxteption of the llonorable Justice ~lcDonough who
had disqualified himself, ·this Court stated the law in
l~tah relating to applieation of the \Yorkmen's 8ompensation Ad to an emplo~·ep on the employee's lunch hour.
The case appears to be directly in point and to ade<luately settle the law in this arPa. The fads in that
ea~e were as follows:
Appellant was a regular employee of respondent. She had taken advantage of her employee disc ount privilege b~· purchasing two roomsiz-ed rugs. During her lunch hour period she
went out to the parking lot and got her automobile and brought it around to customer pickup
for the purpose of taking delivery of said merehandise. She \\·as about to back her car down the
ramp when another en1ployee asked her not t~o do
this because theY had to back the compan~· truck
in to load it for 'the next dav'~ deliveriPs. So, :-;he
dr'ove her car around to th~ end 'Of the ramp and
parked at one of the walkways, dismounted, and
was proceedin bo· alon 0o· a \Yallnn1 Y• to the back door
.
when a pile of tires fell ·On her, causing the mjuriP~ eomplained of. ..:\11 of tlw above event:1
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uvell!Ted oll respondent's pre1nises. Appellant had
intended to leave• her e1nployer's property and
dPlivPr thesp rugs to her borne smne distance
awav. i\lter .the accident she did, in fact, drive
ILPr :·ar home, whei'e the rugs ,,~ere unloaded. She
thPn returned to work.
';'h,• ( 'ourt said:

"Did appellant's injuries arise out of or in
the ('our~e of her employn1ent within the provisions of :1C>-1--tCJ, l~.C.A. 19531 rrhe answer t•o this
qtwstion must be in the affinnative. An employee
d<H·~ not necessarily and ipso fac:to lose his status
a:-; sueh when the noon whis·tle blows. Stwte Hd.
Com. Y. Industrial Cmu., 56 Utah 252, 190 P.
;)-t-t. He may eat his lunch at the place where
he may be in connecti1on with his duties, or a1t the
dt>~ignatl•ct place (Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Industrial Com., ()/ Utah 537, :2-±8 P. 490) and still
remain within the scope of the Cmnpensa:tion Act.
TraYPlt•rs Ins. Co. v. 1\fcAllister, 345 S.vV. 2d 355
(Tt>x.). Employers :Mutual Ins. Co. v. Industrial
l 'om., :2;)0 P. 39-1 (Colo.). In the case at bar the
employee \ra~ accorded the fringe benefit of being
able to purchase merchandise at a discount and
to takP delivery of such articles during the noon
hour. Such benefits are considered to be helpful
in employer-employee relations, and Inost of the
decided cases hold that the servant has the proteetion of the compensation acts if injured while
attempting to ta:ke advantage of such privileges
during the lunch hour and ·while 1011 the employer's
premises .. Tim~. cmnpensabon has been upheld
\\~here the employee sustains an injury while participating in athletic events, expressly or impliedly encouraged by the employer (Henry v. Lit
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Bro., 165 A. 2d 406 ( Pa.) ; Geary v. Anaconda
Copper Min. Co., 188 P. 2d 185 (I\l'ont.) and,
where it was made to appear that the empl'oye 1·
encouraged his help to use or purchase equipment
on the premises for personal purposes, industrial
cJompens·altion has been approved. :Maheux v.
Oove, etc., 164 A. 2d 574 (N.H.) And see Daniels
v. Krey Packing Co., 346 S.W. 2d 78 (Mo.). On
the other hand, where it appears that the employee was injured while doing an entirely personal act or something forbidden by her employer,
a different ru1e would prevail. See Mutti v.
Boeing Aircraft, 172 P. 2d 249 (Wash.); U.S.
Steel v. Cicilian, 180 N.E. 2d 381 (Ind.) ; Perri v.
Scott Testers, etc., 121 A.2d 644 (R.I.) We think
that the trial court correctly held that the employee ~n this case was injured while engaged in
an (J)ctivity encourag·ed or acquiesced in by the
employer during the lunch period and while on
the employer's premises (emphasis added) and
was, there~ore, li1nited to the benefits given under
theW orkmen's Compensation Act."
We can see no way in which it can be legitimately
argued that the l'mployee and appellant in this case
was not ''injured while engaged in an activity encouraged
or acquiesced in by the en1ployer during the lunch period
and \Vhile on e1npl'Oyer's premises" within that rule as
sta;ted in the \Vilston case. It was certainly well known
that substanti'al nun1bers of employees utilized the cafeteria facilities for the purpose for which they were
provided, that i~, a eonvenient eating place for employees
on the rather isolated premises of Sperry Rand at Clrar-
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l'il'ld. 'I'IH· facilitie~ weru ~peeific.ally p1~ovided for this
purpo~e

prhnarily and as a fringe benefit to eutployee~.
'rhl'Y were only slightly used Ly any persons other than.
employee::;. At be:st, it was inconvenient for entployees
to eat elsewhere.
Ita~

been argued by dt•fendant in its l\fmn:orandum
tlmt the eafeteria wa~ not part of the "employer's preuti~l·~ ... however, this argmnent cannot be reconciled with
tht> .authorities. 1,'he cafeteria was within the four walls
of thl' :-;amt• building where the activities of appellant's
t>lllplo~·ment wer·e carried on. rrrue, it was operated hy
a ll'~~l'(', hut tlw term~ uf the lease have never been utade
part or the record and, in fact, we1~e not deemed to be
t·elevant by the Industrial Commission in 1naking its
finding. Certainly, it is customary flor a lessor to retain
:-;ome right~ over premises leased and, as a 1natter of
fad, und~r the leas·e in questiun, the lessor asstuned the
obligations of cleaning up. The cafeteria was certainly
a~ much a part of the prentises as was the parking lot
of ~Par~. Roebuck and Company in the Wilson case, or
a:-; much a part of the pre1nises as many of the places de~erilwd in thr authorities hereafter cited w'hich were
places other than the actual location of the acts covered
hy tlw employment. In Shields L Am. lJiotori:st Ins. Co.
It

~tii F'~d 49, the employer maintained a cafeteria thro1tgh
(I

les~ce for the joint convenience of the con1p:any and

it~ employ~e:-: and s•o that the einp}oye·es could ren1ain
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within the yard within the lunch period. rrhe claimant
during hii:l lunch period was walking down a .path pro,
vided by the employt>r toward the .cafeteria when he
slipped and sustained. injuries. For his damages, he
brought an action against his employer's liability immrer
under the provisions o.f the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act. The Court entered a smnmary judgment
for the insurer, holding that the Compensation Act
should be liberally const~·ued in f:avor of coverage. The
Oourt said:
"Unquestionably if there were a suit for
Workmen's Compensation the einpJoyee would be
successful. That fact, about which no reasonable
man would disagree, negatives plaintiff's right to
re0over here . . . Whether injury to a workman
arises out of and in the course of employment is
whether the nature of the employment was such
that the risk from which the injury resulted was
greater for the workn1an than a person not engaged in the empl1oyment."
To the same effect i:-; .N:a6o·1ud Surefry Corp. v. Bellah, (Tex.) 245 F2d 936.
~umerous o'ther authioritie;-; including those cited in

the decision of this Court in the Wilson v. Sears, Roebuck
and Company ra~P support the po~iti'on of appellant:
In 1 Larson \Y1orkmen's C01npensation Law, Sec. 21.-·
:21, pag·es 29R-99, the rules 1l n' ;-;t,ah-'d a~.; follows:
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"injuries occurring· on the premises during
u. regular lunch hour arise in the course of eui-

ployment, even though the interval is technically
oubide tlw regular hours of e1nployment in the
~l'HSL' that the worker receives no pay for that
time and is in no degree under the eontr'ol of the
employer, being· free to go where she please~.
'''!,here are at least four situations in which
eour~t> of employutent goes beY'ond an einplu~·pp ·~ fixed hours of work; the tiine spent going

tlw

and coming on tht> premises; an interval before
working h'ours while waiting to begin or uraking
preparations, :and a sintilar interval after hours ;
regular unpaid rP~t periods taken on the premises,
and unpaid lunch hours on the premises. A definite pattern can be discerned here. In e~ach instance the time, although strictly outside the fixed
working hours, is closely contiguous to them;
the activity to which that ti1ne is devoted is related to the employn1ent, whether it takes the
form of going or con1ing, preparing f'or work, or
ministering to pers,onal necessities such as food
and rP~t; and, above all, the employee is within
the 8patiallimits of his employment."
And at page 300, the same author says:
··In any case, most courts have concluded that
the unpaid lunch hour on the premises should be
d€Pmed to fall within the C'ourse of enipl6J1nent."
And at page 304, he states:
. "But en.:n if the en1ployee has to pay for the
tood out of Ius own poeket, the connection with the
Plllployment remains an1plP. The lunch i8 still
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wi,thin th~ category of lunch taken on the employer s premises, and the fact that the employer prepares or sells the food only strengthens the <'l;tployment link. Thus, in a North Car'olina caHe,
a textile m'anufactu:r.er siOld his employees coupon
books with which they could purchase sandwiches
and cold drinks from an employee specially engaged to sell these refreslunents. Plaintiff employee suff.ered severe gastric disturbances from
spoiled rood s1o acquired, but her negligence action
was dismissed on the ground of exclusive Compens·ation Act ~overage."
To the same effect se·e 58 Am. JuL, vVorkmen's Cow.
pens.at~on, Sec. 228 :
"While Not Actively Engaged or during Intermission. - W·orkers in a factory :or other place
of empJoyment do not necessarily depart from
the course of their en1ployment by enguging in
social intercourse, or visiting in othe:r parts of the
building or premises, while not actually employed
in the performance of their duties, so as to thereby
deprive themselves of the right to CJompensation
f.or injuries received while so engaged. In anumber of cases it has been held that an injured workman is entitled to compensation for injuries received on the e1npioyer's prmnises, although the
ac({ident occurred during lunch period when work
was not actively in p1~ogress, where the eating of
the lunch on the premises was with the employer's knowledge and consent, express or implied.
* * * The general ru1e that injuries occurring
during an intern1ission for rest or refreshment
arise in the coui"se of the employment is not afSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fected by the f~act that the etnployee is paid by the
hour and ree(:'iVP~ no pay fior the period covered
by such intennission."
~l'"

ah;o the same work at page 242:
"Such acts are reasonably necessary to the
health and comfort of :an employee while at work,
such as the s atisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or
other physical demands, or protecting himself
from exees~ive cold, although personal to himself
and not strictly acts orf service in his mnployinent,
are nevertheless incidental to the employment,
and injuries sustained in the performance of such
an act are generally held to be compensable as
arising out of and in the course of the employment."
1

An t'Xet'llent case discussing the entire prob1em and
ronsidering it at some length, is Thomas v. Proctor &
Gamble Mfg. Oo. (Kan.) 179 P. 372. In that case the
l'onrt said :
''The fact that she was working by the hour,
and that the accident took place out of working
hours, do~~ not conclusively establish that it did
not ()(>cur in the course of her empl1oyment. The
shortness of the intermission suggests that it was
tlw expectation that Inost of tlhe employees would
remain on the premi,ses, and the practice shown
by the evidence confirms this. The purpose of
the plaintiff ~and her associates in remaining in
the factory after their hmch had been eaten was
preswnably to be on hand when work com1nenced,
in order that there 1nig-ht be no delay____)a matter in
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which the e1nployer had an obvious interest. • * *
In the leading English case on the subject which
has been frequently ·cited . with. approval 'in this
country, the scope of the decision was fairly indicated by this language of the headnote:
" 'A workman was paid by the hour for the
number of hours per week that he was actually
·engaged on his work, not including the midday
dinner hour. During· that hour he was at liberty
to stay and take his meal on the premises, or to
go elsewhere. He stayed on the premises, and
sat down to eat his dinner, and while so doing
a wall fell upon him, and he was injured. Held,
that during the dinner hour there had been no
bre·a$: in the employment of the workman, and
that he was entitled to claim compensation.' Blovel vs. Sawyer, 1 K.B. 1904, 271.
"In the opini,on of the Master of the Rolls
the whole situation was gone over in these words:

'' '* * * It seems to 1ne that, notwithstanding
what rs alleged as to the payment being for the
hours in which the applicant was actually engaged in work, and not for the time in which he
took his meals, we 1nust take a broader view, and
treat him as continuing in ·the employment of
the master by the consent of the master, inasmuch as it is for the master's advantage that the
workmen should have an opportunity to feed
themselves. * * * From the mere facts that he
w.a·s n.ot paid for his particular time, and that he
was not engaged in the n1ain purpose of his work,
it cannot, as a matter of law, be said that he had
ceased to be in the employm·ent of his master.'
Pages 273, 27 4.
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"()n(' of

tht• Lord .Ju:-;ti<'t':-; ::;aid:

.. ·t t abo a p pt~a r~ that he \Va~ not obliged to
leave tlw plaee whPrP l1P was working and obtain
shelter and food elsewhere. '"rhat being the case,
how l•an it be said that thi::; accident did not occur
in tht• ('onrsl:' of his employntent''?
"Another added :
" 'In my viPw it <·an make no difference if
the fad is that by tlw terms of the particular engagenHmt the wodnnan was to have the right, if
~o minded, to get his dinner on the employer'~
premises. I think it would be to place a narrow
construction on the act if we held that the accident to thP appellant did not occur in the course
of hi~ emploYJ.nent.'
"Of an employee who during the noon intermission, after eating his lunch on the premises,
fell into thP river and was drowned, it has been
said:

"'All tht} circumstances and facts tend to
that up to this time he expected to resume
hi~ work when lunching time had expired, and
hence he was within the scope of his service when
walking at this place.' Milwaukee Western F. Co.
,.. Industrial Commission, 159 Wis. 636, 642,
150 X. W. 998,999.
~how

"Other

expres~ions

bearing on the matter

are:
.. ·TJw relation of ma::;ter and servant, insofar as it involves the obligation of master to
protect tlw ~Prvant, is not suspended during the
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no_on. hou!·, ':her~ t~e lHa~ter expressly, or uy
fau 1mphcahon, 1nv1tes h1s servants to remain
on the premises in the immediate vicinity of the
work' Bradbury's vVorkmen's Compensation
(3rd Ed.) 524.
" 'As directly applied to the noon intermiHsion, it is a long and well-settled rule that thP
service tie, or contractual relations and obligations between 1naster and servant, is not broken
by such suspension of all activities directly beneficial to tlw ·employer.' Haller v. City of Lansing,
195 Mich. 753, 758, 162 N. \V. 335, 337 (1. R. A.
1917E, 324.)
"See also, Boyd's \Vorkmen's Compensation,
§481; 1 Honold on \Vor:kmen's Compensation,
§111; Etherton v. Johnston Knitting l\Iills Co.,
185 App. Div. 820, 17:2 N.Y. Supp. 72+; Raeine
Rubber Co. v. Industrial Commission, 165 \Vis.
600, 162 K. W. 644: Griffith v. Cole Bros. et al.
(Iowa) 165 X. \V. 577, L.R.A. 1918F, 923; Riley
v Cudahy Packing Co., 82 Neb. 319, 117 l\. W.
765; In re Sun dine, :21 S ::\1 ass. 1, 105 N. K 433,
L. R. A. 1916A 318."
See also the case of E1nployer's ~~ ut. Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Com1nission of Colorado, (Colo.) 230 P. 394:
"The finding~ of the commission, so far as
now 1naterial, .are as follows:
" "The elaimant was injured during the noon
hour. He caine out from the mine where he was
working and in attending to a call of nature
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stopped under an old bank on the top of the m.ain
slope portal, and wa~ ca~1ght by a cave-in of
thi~ bank. Hi:-~ at'eid('Ilt occurred on the employpr's premi~ws and during the clai1nant's working hours.'
.. On appeal to the district court, the petition
:-;ought to :-;pt asidP the award on the ground that

there is no ·evidence to support tht> finding that
the accident occurred during the einployee's working hours. There is no 1uerit in that ground. The
fact that the accident oecurred during the noon
hour, when no actual work was being done, dnes
not preclude the accident frmn being in the cotusP
of the employn1ent. Haller v. City· of Lansing,
195 ~fi<'h. 7fl:3, 162 N. W. 335, L. R. A. 1917E,
:~2-l. ,,
Another similar case is Texas Employers' lnsura11ce
.lsso. l'. /)acidso;;z., (Tex.), 29 5S. W. 2d 482.
~PP

also Caporale v. D~partment of Taxation and
Finance, (N.Y.). 1-+2 N.E. 2d 213.
'l'o the srune effect, see . .Jmel'ican Motors Corp. v.
htdn,-;frial Comm. (Wis.), 83 N.\V. :2d 71-l, and Dyer v .
.'-.>ar ..... Roebuck and Company (Mich)., 85 X.vY. 2d 153.

ln the case of Twin Peaks Ca11ning Co. c. Industrial
Comm. of Ctah, 196 P. 853, a 15-year-old en1ployee of a
eanning factorv• "·as killed in an elevator while returnino·
b
tn It;:-; ~tat.ion after having visited "·ith an employPe
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on a different level during a leisure period. It was hel<.l
that Lhe accident was compensable.

And in the recent case of Stroad u. Ind!lsirial

j

Oorn1n. (Ut.), 27:2 P. 2d 187, a police sergeant who wa~

off duty was assisting two other officers in transfering
some beverages to an automobile for transmission to
a police benefit party. \Vhile so engaged, his servie(·
revolver fell and discharged, striking and killing him.
The accident was held to be cmnpensable, the court citing
with approval the Twin Peaks Canning Compan)' case.

Col.son vs. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, :25:2 P. 2d 10-±9, in
which the Idaho Court allowed cmnpensation to surveyor
who was injured while target practicing with his own
gun during the lunch hour. This case is cited with
approval by the l 'tah Supreme Court.
Stroud vs. Jndu:)trial Commissio11, 2 Ut. 2d. 270,
272 P. 2d 187. This Utah case has been covered in
~IWITy's .l\lemorandum.
Goodyear Aircraft Corp. L:s. Jndustrial C'om missi.on,
62 Ariz. 398, 158 P. 2d 511 ( 1945).
E·mployers iliutual Ius. Co. c. .·. lndu.strial Commission, 7() Colo. S-1-, 230 P. 394 (1924).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21

/Jnmphrey v~. Ind1u;lrial Conwtis ...,·iou, 285 Ill. :37:2,
l:!U ~.E. 816 (1918).

Zar/1a vs. Lane, 322 ~lass. 132, 76 ~.E. 2d 318
1

I ~~~7).

Shields t:.s Am. Jlotori.st Ins. Co. (CCA5), 267 F.
~~1 ~H

( 1959).

Satio11al Snr£ty Corp. us. Bellah (Tex.), 245 F.

2u

936.
Te.ras Employers Insurance Assodation vs. Davidsun. ~!)5 S. \V. 2d. 482 (1956), in which the Court found
that a slip and fall during the lunch period in the work
nrea wa~ covered by W ork1nen's Compensation.

Amaican .lfotors
.
Corp. vs. Industrial Comm·ission,
":~ ~.\Y. :2d 714, (Wis. 1957), in which the Court held
that a fall from a 8tack of pack crates after rest during
the luneh hour was compensable.

Dyer rs. Sears and Roebuck Company, 85 N.\Y. 2d
1:1 ~ {~Iichigan 1957), in which the Court held that a fall
nfter leaving the company lunchroon1, on the stairs, still
during the lunch hour, was compensable.
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SUMMARY
In sumrnary appellant contends that the Wilson ';s.
Sears, Roebuck and Company case is controlling; that
the injuries which occurred during appellant's lunch hour,
'>rithin the building wher·e appellant was employed at the
leased cafeteria therein, arose out of or in the course of
appellant's en1ployment and are compensable under the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Appellant, therefore, urges that the Court should reverse
the decision of the Industrial Commission of Utah and
find that appellant's injuries are subject to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHARLIER
Carman E. Kipp
Attorneys for Appellant
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